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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was born out of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 19341 (1934 Act) in the aftermath of the
Great Depression as a means for regulating the stock market, enhancing
transparency and corporate information-sharing and, ultimately, protecting
investors. Armed with Congress’ grant of rulemaking and enforcement
authority, the SEC, since its inception, has promulgated rules aimed at
realizing the SEC’s mandate. But securities regulation by the SEC did not
come about unopposed. Indeed, since as early as 1936, interest parties
have challenged a number of the SEC’s promulgated rules.2 This Comment
will explore the recent history of judicial challenge to SEC rulemaking,
specifically in the area of securities regulation. Through an examination of
the eight cases since 1990, where the D.C. Circuit invalidated an SECpromulgated rule in the area of securities regulation, this Comment argues
that the D.C. Circuit’s most recent ruling in Business Roundtable v. SEC3
(Business Roundtable II) represents a turning point indicative of an
unprecedented level of heightened judicial scrutiny of securities regulation.
Such heightened scrutiny, epitomized by Business Roundtable II’s elevated
demands—and, in effect, substantive review—of the SEC’s cost-benefit
analysis, poses a real threat to future attempts at securities regulation, as
well as SEC rulemaking abilities more generally.4

1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006).
2. See Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936) (challenging the SEC’s ability to prevent a
party’s withdrawal of a registration statement in the face of an SEC proceeding challenging
the truth and sufficiency of that statement); see also E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B.
Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The Vanishing Importance of Securities
and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571 (2004) (examining every U.S. Supreme Court decision
on a securities issue between 1933 and 2004).
3. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
4. During the final editorial work on this Comment, the Columbia Business Law
Review published Anthony W. Mongone, Note, Business Roundtable: A New Level of
Judicial Scrutiny and Its Implications in a Post-Dodd-Frank World, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 746 (2012). While there is some overlap, Mr. Mongone’s Note and this Comment are
different because they each examine Business Roundtable II through a different lens. Most
notably, Mr. Mongone analyzes the court’s holding by looking at the legislative history of
the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 and the standard of judicial
review contemplated by the Act. This Comment, conversely, approaches Business
Roundtable II through an examination of the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in prior cases
concerning SEC rules and regulations. Separately, James D. Cox and Benjamin J.C.
Baucom argue in The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation
of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1813 (2012) (also published during the
final editorial work on this Comment), that “the level of review invoked by the D.C. Circuit
in Business Roundtable and its earlier decisions is dramatically inconsistent with the
standard enacted by Congress.” Though similar, my Comment and the Cox and Baucom
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Setting the Stage: From New York to Washington, D.C.
In July of 2011, only eleven days before the D.C. Circuit issued its
opinion in Business Roundtable II, Judge Rakoff of the Southern District of
New York held that Rajat Gupta, a corporate executive tied to the insidertrading scheme the SEC was investigating at Raj Rajaratnam’s Galleon
Group, may bring a lawsuit against the SEC alleging that the SEC, in its
investigation, had violated Gupta’s rights under the Equal Protection
Clause.5 In so deciding, Judge Rakoff served the SEC a number of strong
blows, from questioning the SEC’s motives when it filed an administrative
proceeding against Gupta,6 to all but accusing the SEC of arbitrarily
discriminating against identical defendants.7
Just a few months after that opinion, Judge Rakoff struck once again
in SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., where he departed, though not
unprecedentedly,8 from the trend of courts accepting settlements that the
SEC reaches with other parties.9 The SEC and Citigroup had reached the

articles are different, because the latter compares the D.C. Circuit’s standard of review in
Business Roundtable II and its predecessors with that prescribed by Congress. This
Comment, however, compares the court’s approach in Business Roundtable II with the
approach in that case’s predecessors. The Journal of Corporation Law also published Grant
M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law and Economics of Business Roundtable
v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L. 101 (2012). In that piece, the authors focus on the issue of
shareholder voting rights and discuss how Business Roundtable II is part of a “growing
preference amongst some law and economics commentators for a Potemkin-Village version
of shareholder democracy . . . .” Id. at 102. By contrast, this Comment examines the D.C.
Circuit’s approach to all SEC rulemaking, not just rules related to proxy access. Finally, in
Rachel A. Benedict, Note, Judicial Review of SEC Rules: Managing the Costs of CostBenefit Analysis, 97 MINN. L. REV. 278 (2012), the author reviews a trilogy of cases that
includes Business Roundtable II, id. at 284, and advocates the need for a more clearly
defined scope of SEC cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 279. This Comment takes a different
approach in that it provides a comprehensive historical case law analysis of judicial review
of SEC rulemaking since the first Business Roundtable case in 1990. This Comment is also
different in that it sees Business Roundtable II as a turning point in judicial review of SEC
rulemaking, and thus discusses this latest case’s significance and consequences for federal
securities law generally.
5. Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
6. See id. at 506 (describing the SEC’s move as a “seeming exercise in forumshopping”).
7. See id. at 514 (“[W]e have the unusual case where there is already a welldeveloped public record of Gupta being treated substantially disparately from 28 essentially
identical defendants, with not even a hint from the SEC, even in their instant papers, as to
why this should be so.”).
8. See, e.g., SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
9. 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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settlement at issue in the form of a consent judgment.10 In this case, as had
been practiced by the SEC and regulated parties before, the consent
judgment required Citigroup to pay a penalty, but allowed it to refrain from
making any admissions as to the charges.11 When first faced with the SECCitigroup consent judgment, Judge Rakoff put some questions to the
parties, asking, as the basis of his questions, how the settlement would
provide any substantive relief to harmed parties.12 Ultimately, the court
refused to approve the proposed settlement, because, Judge Rakoff wrote, it
“has not been provided with any proven or admitted facts upon which to
exercise even a modest degree of independent judgment.”13 In refusing to
rubberstamp the consent judgment, Judge Rakoff further wrote that “[a]n
application of judicial power that does not rest on facts is worse than
mindless, it is inherently dangerous”14 and concluded that a consent
judgment such as the one presented “serves no lawful or moral purpose and
is simply an engine of oppression.”15
A number of commentators have viewed such opinions from the
Southern District of New York as a sign of rising hostility towards the
SEC. For example, Michael McConnell, a former judge on the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, called the Citigroup opinion “startling to
say the least.”16 He continued: “Judge Rakoff has effectively taken on the
role of a prosecutor, second-guessing the SEC’s law enforcement
decisions” and ultimately, he projected, leading to impossibly costly
litigation that would prevent the SEC from pursuing many enforcement
actions.17 On the other hand, some see the circuit court’s opinions as less
of a criticism of the SEC and more an expression of concern with holding
Wall Street and financial institutions accountable.18 This view prompts the

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 330.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 335.
Id.
Joe Palazzolo, Law Blog Expert Panel: Ex-Judges on Rakoff’s Citi Ruling, LAW
BLOG (Dec. 19, 2011, 10:21 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/12/19/law-blog-expertpanel-ex-judges-on-rakoffs-citi-ruling/.
17. Id.
18. See e.g., Reynolds Holding, Courts More Willing to Second-Guess Wall Street,
BREAKINGVIEWS (Dec. 05, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2011/12/05/courts
-more-willing-to-second-guess-wall-street/ (“[Judge Rakoff’s] opinion showed little fear of
creating market uncertainty, arguing that the public interest is better served by holding
companies’ feet to the fire than by quietly settling disputes without any admission of
wrongdoing.”); Daniel Kaufmann & Veronika Penciakova, Judge Rakoff Challenge to the
S.E.C.: Can Regulatory Capture be Reversed?, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 02, 2011), http://ww
w.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/1202_rakoff_challenge_kaufmann.aspx
(“The
judge’s
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question: Is it within the courts’ purview to seek accountability from
private institutions?
The Second Circuit has since granted a stay to Judge Rakoff’s ruling
in Citigroup.19 In its decision, the Second Circuit criticized Judge Rakoff’s
view that the SEC-Citigroup settlement was not in the public interest. “It is
not . . . the proper function of federal courts to dictate policy to executive
administrative agencies,” read the opinion.20 “[F]ederal judges—who have
no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by
those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public
interest are not judicial ones . . . . ”21
Irrespective of the Second Circuit’s stay in Citigroup, the New York
court’s opinions give pause for thought as to whether we are at a new
junction in the relationship between the SEC and the judiciary. To explore
the existence and extent of such a phenomenon, this Comment will look to
the very center of judicial review of the SEC—the D.C. Circuit and its line
of opinions on SEC securities regulation
B. Judicial Review of Agency Rules
Over the years, and as the SEC, along with other agencies, was
challenged in the courts, a number of administrative law doctrines were
developed to demarcate the limits of judicial review of agency rules and
orders. Most relevantly, agency action became entitled to greater judicial
deference after Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council,
Inc.22 Under what became known as “Chevron deference,” a court reviews
an agency’s construction of a statute with a two-step test.23 First, the court
asks “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue.”24 If Congressional intent is clear, the court’s inquiry ends. If,
however, the court finds the intent of Congress ambiguous, or if the statute
is silent with respect to the issue, “the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”25
ruling brings to light, once more, the extent to which the regulatory agency may have been
subject to capture and undue influence by financial institutions, while also potentially
challenging the status quo.”).
19. U.S. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 169 (2d Cir. 2012).
20. Id. at 163.
21. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
866 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
23. Id. at 842-43.
24. Id. at 842.
25. Id. at 843.
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A second enhancement to judicial review of agency decisions and
rules was the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which
requires, among other things, that a court set aside agency actions it finds
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”26 In determining whether an agency action is
arbitrary or capricious, a court must ensure that the agency in question has
“examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation
for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made.’”27 Unlike Chevron, the APA and the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of it in State Farm, demonstrate heightened judicial scrutiny
for agency actions. Indeed, the APA’s instruction became known as the
“hard look doctrine,” because it requires courts to more closely examine
information the agency provides in its reasoning.28 Enacted in 1966, the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard was viewed as a response to the
“pervasive distrust of administrative agencies and the growth of public
interest regulation.”29 By virtue of the nature of lawsuits brought to them,
the judges of the D.C. Circuit played a key role in the development of
“arbitrary and capricious” review of agency decisions, unanimously
agreeing that the court should not “continue the deference that
characterized judicial review of administrative agency action during the
1940s and 1950s.”30 The standard of review has been wielded by the D.C.
Circuit to invalidate countless agency actions over the decades, including
the SEC’s Rule 14a-11 in Business Roundtable II. Indeed, “courts continue
to develop administrative common law doctrines and to employ those
already in their doctrinal arsenal . . . with regularity and vigor.”31
Congress has also enacted the National Securities Market
Improvement Act of 1996 to amend the Investment Company Act of 1940
(ICA) to require the SEC in its rulemaking to consider: (1) “whether an
action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest,” (2) “the protection
of investors,” and, (3) “whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.”32 The Act thus in a way complements
“arbitrary and capricious” review by specifying what the SEC in particular
26. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
27. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
28. See Matthew Warren, Note, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the
Development of the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L.J. 2599 (2002).
29. Id. at 2599.
30. Id. at 2600.
31. Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1293, 1320 (2012).
32. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106(a), 15 U.S.C. §
77b(b) (2000).
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must consider so that its actions are not found to have violated the APA’s
hard look doctrine.
Most recently, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order
13563,33 “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review,” requiring
administrative agencies to: (1) run a cost-benefit analysis of its proposed
rules, (2) tailor its regulations such that society is least burdened, (3) select
approaches that maximize net benefits, (4) specify performance objectives,
and (5) consider alternatives to direct regulations.34 The order further
requires all agencies to use the “best available techniques to quantify
anticipated present and future benefits and costs as accurately as
possible.”35 Because the SEC is an independent regulatory commission and
not an executive agency, Executive Order 13563 technically does not apply
to the SEC’s rulemaking.36 The order was thus extended to explicitly apply
to independent regulatory agencies through Executive Order 13,579,37
“Regulation and Independent Regulatory Agencies.” The latter order
underscores that “[i]ndependent regulatory agencies, no less than executive
agencies, should promote that goal [outlined in Executive Order 13,563].”38
C. Judicial Review of SEC Actions
It is against this administrative law backdrop and the still-evolving balance
between agency rulemaking authority and judicial review that the securities
regulations of the SEC have been challenged in courts. Over more than
two decades, since 1990, the SEC has had to (unsuccessfully) defend eight
securities-related regulations in the D.C. Circuit.39 This Comment will
33. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Assessing Agency Cost-Benefit Analysis for Dodd-Frank Rules, SECURITIES
LAW DAILY, Apr. 30, 2012, available at 2012 WL 1452277 (explaining that although
Executive Orders like this one technically do not apply to the SEC because it is an
independent regulatory commission and not an executive branch agency, agencies have
traditionally followed the spirit of executive orders).
37. Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July 11, 2011).
38. Id.
39. The eight cases are: Bus. Roundtable v. U.S. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(challenging SEC rule on proxy access and shareholder-nominated candidates); Am. Equity
Life Ins. Co. v. U.S. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (challenging SEC regulation of
fixed income annuities); Fin. Planning Ass’n v. U.S. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(challenging exemption of broker-dealers from the Investment Advisers Act); Goldstein v.
U.S. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (challenging SEC rule on hedge fund exemptions);
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. U.S. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (challenging
same upon remand); Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. U.S. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (challenging SEC regulation of mutual funds); Teicher v. U.S. SEC, 177 F.3d 1016
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (challenging SEC limitations on persons who commit certain offenses
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examine each of these cases and argue that, while the D.C. Circuit vacated
the rule at issue in each instance, the most recent of the cases, Business
Roundtable II, represents a turning point in judicial review of the SEC’s
actions. Unlike in preceding cases, the D.C. Circuit in Business
Roundtable II conducted an unusually aggressive examination of the
factual record the SEC presented in support of its rule.40 Indeed, especially
viewed in tandem with recent court actions in New York, Business
Roundtable II amounts to the D.C. Circuit’s “strongest admonition of the
SEC to date”41 and may hint at general rising distrust, or even hostility, by
the federal courts towards the SEC. The court’s analysis in Business
Roundtable II also raises serious questions about the SEC’s rulemaking
power in the area of securities regulation, as it sets an unprecedentedly high
bar for the SEC to meet before it promulgates a new rule.
This Comment will explore the recent history of the adjudication of
securities regulation, bookended by the two Business Roundtable cases, and
the possible implications of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in the 2011 case. Part
II of this Comment looks at Business Roundtable II, its precedents, and
how the two differ. In Part III, I examine the significance of the
phenomenon of heightened judicial scrutiny of SEC actions and its
potential repercussions. Finally, Part IV briefly addresses any alternatives
that exist to the looming status quo.
What we see today could signal the onset of a new era in the
relationship between federal courts and the SEC. It is important to be
aware of these undercurrents of change, signaling rising distrust of SEC
rulemaking. It is equally important to consider what the consequences of
such a change, if realized, would be, so that the strides made in securities
regulation since the 1934 Act are not undermined.
II. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE II AND ITS SEVEN SISTERS
A. The Road to Business Roundtable II
The SEC has no doubt had a tumultuous relationship with the D.C.
Circuit and the Supreme Court. While judicial analyses of SEC action have
ranged between “expansive” and “restrictive,”42 in the few years before

related to investment advising); Bus. Roundtable v. U.S. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (challenging rule regarding corporate listings on national security exchanges).
40. Business Roundtable II, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
41. Thomas Stratmann & J.W. Verret, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Damage Share
Value in Small Publicly Traded Companies?, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1445 (2012).
42. See Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 2 (examining every U.S. Supreme Court
decision on a securities issue between 1933 and 2004 and categorizing each as exhibiting
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1990, the SEC was experiencing a period of relatively low judicial
resistance—the SEC “often prevailed in the lower courts and saw the
Supreme Court deny numerous petitions for certiorari.”43 These few years
of deference to the SEC came to an abrupt end with the D.C. Circuit’s 1990
ruling in Business Roundtable v. SEC (Business Roundtable I),44 striking an
SEC rule pertaining to self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”), thus
marking “increasing hostility towards SEC regulations not specifically
grounded in statutory text”45 and “presag[ing] the current attitude towards
SEC rulemaking.”46
In the twenty-one years bookended by the D.C. Circuit’s decisions
in Business Roundtable I and Business Roundtable II, the SEC defended
securities-related rules against challenges seven times in the same court. It
lost every time.
1. Business Roundtable I
In Business Roundtable I, analyzing the issue under Chevron
deference, the D.C. Circuit found “in excess of the Commission’s
authority”47 its Rule 19c-4, which barred SROs from listing the stock of “a
corporation that takes any corporate action with the effect of nullifying,
restricting or disparately reducing the per share voting rights of [existing
common stockholders].”48 Declaring that Rule 19c-4 “directly interferes
with the substance of what the shareholders may enact,”49 the court
reasoned that it was impermissible for the SEC to promulgate a rule that
“directly controls the substantive allocation of powers among classes of
shareholders,”50 which is normally in the purview of state corporate law.51
The court examined the SEC’s claim that it could promulgate such a rule

either an “expansive” or “restrictive” reading of the statutes granting the SEC rulemaking
authority).
43. Chasing the Devil Around the Stump: Securities Regulation, the SEC and the
Courts, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N HISTORICAL SOCIETY (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.sechistoric
al.org/museum/galleries/ctd/ctd_05a_era_caution_adjusts.php (citing Sullivan & Thompson,
supra note 2).
44. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
45. Jodie A. Kirshner, What Rough Beast . . . Slouches Towards Bethlehem: Business
Roundtable v. SEC and the SEC’s Delegated Rulemaking Authority, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 497, 513 (2006).
46. Id.
47. 905 F.2d at 407. “SEC” and the “Commission” are used interchangeably.
48. Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
49. Id. at 411.
50. Id. at 407.
51. Id. at 412.
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because it falls under its mandate of protecting public interest.52 To this,
the court plainly said, “‘public interest’ is never an unbounded term.”53
Finally, the court held that it was not the intent of Congress for the SEC to
regulate corporate governance.54
In sum, the court looked at the SEC’s interpretation of congressional
intent through the lens of Chevron, deemed that Rule 19c-4 regulated
substance whereas Congress had only meant for the SEC to regulate
procedure, and held the rule invalid. For nine years thereafter, Business
Roundtable I was the D.C. Circuit’s final and clearest word on what the
SEC can and cannot regulate, marking a clear departure from how the SEC
had fared in lower courts in previous years.55
2. Teicher v. SEC56
The Teicher rule challenge originally stemmed from the SEC’s action
against two individuals who had been criminally convicted for participation
in an insider-trading scheme.57 Upon being barred from participating from
various branches of the securities industry, the two challenged the SEC’s
interpretation of section 15(b)(6) of the 1934 Act, which allowed the SEC
to “place limitations on the activities or functions of [such convicted
persons] . . . .”58 Applying Chevron, the court held that the SEC’s
interpretation that the section allows it to bar convicted persons’
participation in any securities industry it controls was unreasonable and
contrary to the intent of Congress.59 Once again, the opinion looked solely
at the SEC interpretation of a statute and compared it with context and
congressional intent.

52. Id. at 413.
53. Id. at 413.
54. Id. at 417.
55. Chasing the Devil Around the Stump: Securities Regulation, the SEC and the
Courts, VIRTUAL MUSEUM AND ARCHIVE OF THE HISTORY OF SECURITIES REGULATION (Feb.
23, 2012), http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/ctd/; see also Kirshner, supra note
45, at 513 (contending that “the Business Roundtable [I] holding appears more likely today
than it did fourteen years ago when the case was decided”).
56. 177 F.3d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
57. Id. at 1017.
58. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(6), 104 Stat. 931, 952-53 (1990) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6)(A) (2006)).
59. Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1021.
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3. Chamber of Commerce I60
In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC (“Chamber of
Commerce I”), the D.C. Circuit invalidated an SEC rule that required
mutual funds to have no less than seventy-five percent independent
directors and an independent chairman.61 While the court found that the
SEC had authority to promulgate the rule under the ICA and that the rule
was not arbitrary or capricious under the APA, it faulted the SEC for its
failure under the ICA to consider the impact of the rule on efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.62 Recognizing the difficulty of running
reliable empirical studies, the D.C. Circuit wrote that “uncertainty may
limit what the Commission can do, but it does not excuse the Commission
from its statutory obligation to do what it can to apprise itself—and hence
the public and the Congress—of the economic consequences of a proposed
regulation . . . .”63 In addition, the SEC, in explaining why it had adopted
the rule, did not address an alternative to the rule put forward during the
notice and comment period and raised by two dissenting Commissioners.64
The court found that this was equally fatal to the rule’s promulgation,
because while the “Commission is not required to consider ‘every
alternative . . . conceivable by the mind of man . . .[,]’”65 that particular
alternative was “neither frivolous nor out of bounds and the SEC therefore
had an obligation to consider it.”66 While the court did not require that the
SEC always conduct an empirical study (the “decision not to do an
empirical study does not make that an unreasoned decision”67), the case
provided guidance on the process of SEC rulemaking by suggesting that
the SEC “would be well served to [conduct empirical studies] when facts
are available”68 and to “set out a vague standard for when agency decisions
must be based on empirical data and provide[] open-ended guidelines for
future determinations regarding when it is appropriate for agencies to
engage in rulemaking without considering empirical studies.”69

60. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 144.
63. Id. at 144.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 51 (1983).
66. Id. at 145.
67. Id. at 142.
68. David S. Ruder, Balancing Investor Protection with Capital Formation Needs After
the SEC Chamber of Commerce Case, 26 PACE L. REV. 39, 51 (2005).
69. Brett Friedman et al., Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit: Administrative Law, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 619, 656
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4. Chamber of Commerce II70
In Chamber of Commerce I, the D.C. Circuit remanded the rule to
the SEC “to address the deficiencies.”71 On remand, the SEC re-adopted
the same conditions invalidated in Chamber of Commerce I, adding some
empirical data to bolster its decision. The Chamber of Commerce once
again challenged the rule, and the D.C. Circuit once again held that the
SEC’s process was flawed because the SEC “failed to comply with section
553(c) of the APA, 5 U.S.C § 553(c), by relying on materials not in the
rulemaking record without affording an opportunity for public comment, to
the prejudice of the Chamber.”72 Here, the court held, “[t]he Commission’s
extensive reliance upon extra-record materials in arriving at its cost
estimates, and thus in determining not to modify the two conditions [at
issue in Chamber of Commerce I], however, required further opportunity
for comment . . . ”73—a procedural step that the SEC was deemed to have
failed to follow. In other words, the rule once again failed on a relatively
trivial process ground.
5. Goldstein v. SEC74
At issue here was the SEC’s rule requiring that hedge fund investors
be counted as fund clients for purposes of an exemption that excused
investment advisers with fewer than fifteen clients from registering under
the Investment Advisers Act (IAA).75 The SEC once again failed to defend
the rule, as the D.C. Circuit invalidated it for conflicting with statutory
purpose.76 Analyzing the case through Chevron, the court wrote that
although no official definition existed for “client,” “[t]he lack of a statutory
definition of a word does not necessarily render the meaning of a word
ambiguous.”77
The court also highlighted that the definition the
Commission now sought to apply inexplicably diverged from the SEC’s
own prior definition, rendering it “completely arbitrary.”78 And finally,
because the new rule/definition “create[d] a situation in which funds with
one hundred or fewer investors are exempt from the more demanding
(2006).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
412 F.3d at 145.
443 F.3d at 894.
Id. at 901.
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 874.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 883.
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Investment Company Act, but those with fifteen or more investors trigger
registration under the Advisers Act,” the court held that the rule was
arbitrary.79
Here again, the court found that the SEC statutory
interpretation was impermissible through “narrow”80 reasoning pertaining
to interpretation and process.
6. Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC81
In this case, the SEC had attempted to exempt broker-dealers from the
requirements of the IAA when they receive special compensation for their
services.82 The court found that the first step of Chevron had been satisfied
such that the IAA was not ambiguous as to the definition of “investment
adviser.”83 Consequently, the SEC’s rule exceeded its authority and the
SEC was held to lack the power to craft new exemptions under the Act.84
7. American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC85
The final precedent to Business Roundtable II provides some
foreshadowing for what the court would eventually do in Business
Roundtable II. The SEC rule at issue here classified fixed indexed
annuities (FIAs) offered by insurance companies as non-annuity contracts,
thus requiring that they be subject to regulation under the Securities Act of
1933.86 While the D.C. Circuit held that the SEC’s classification of FIAs
was not unreasonable under Chevron,87 it still found that the SEC had
“failed to consider the efficiency, competition, and capital formation effects
of the new [r]ule” and invalidated the rule under the APA.88 In its analysis,
the court criticized the SEC's claim that the rule would enhance
competition because of the ambiguity that the absence of a rule on the
79. Id. at 884.
80. Dustin G. Hall, The Elephant in the Room: Dangers of Hedge Funds in Our
Financial Markets, 60 FLA. L. REV. 183, 187 (2008).
81. 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
82. Id. at 483.
83. The IAA carved out six exemptions from its broad definition in § 202(a)(11),
including “(C) any broker or dealer whose performance of such services is solely incidental
to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special
compensation therefor.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006). The text of the act also read that
“(H) such other persons not within the intent of this paragraph, as the Commission may
designate by rules and regulations or order.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11).
84. Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d at 492.
85. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. U.S. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
86. Id. at 167.
87. Id. at 174.
88. Id. at 176.
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matter had created. “The SEC cannot justify the adoption of a particular
rule based solely on the assertion that the existence of a rule provides
greater clarity to an area that remained unclear in the absence of any
rule.”89 Rather, the court said, the APA requires “an analysis of whether
the specific rule will promote efficiency, competition and capital
formation.”90 From there, the court held insufficient the SEC’s entire costbenefit analysis, as it was largely based on the weak foundation of the “rule
clarity” rationale, and the SEC had failed to provide empirical data to
support its presumptions.91
In the nineteen years between 1990 and 2009, the D.C. Circuit
invalidated all seven SEC securities regulations challenged in the court.92
The grounds for invalidation varied between faulty statutory interpretation
or lack of authority under Chevron and failure to meet the demands of the
ICA and the APA.93 With this line of holdings, and especially the court’s
reasoning in Chamber of Commerce I and American Equity Life Insurance,
the SEC had been warned that empirical studies will often be required of it,
and that such studies will have to be rule-specific. In no case, however, did
the court engage in aggressive substantive review of the SEC’s empirical
rationale behind its rulemaking.
B. The SEC’s Latest and Biggest Defeat in the D.C. Circuit
In Business Roundtable II, the D.C. Circuit overturned a proxy access
rule promulgated by the SEC, Rule 14a-11, aimed at allowing shareholders
to more easily and cheaply nominate non-incumbent candidates for
corporate boards. Had it been upheld, Rule 14a-11 would have “require[d]
a company subject to the [1934] Act proxy rules . . . to include in its proxy
materials ‘the name of a person or persons nominated by a [qualifying]
shareholder or group of shareholders for election to the board of
directors.’”94 In invalidating the rule, the court held that the SEC had
“acted arbitrarily and capriciously for having failed . . . adequately to assess
the economic effects of a new rule.”95 Stating the rationale plainly, Judge
Ginsburg, writing for the court, wrote that the SEC “inconsistently and
opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of the rule; failed

89. Id. at 177-78.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 179.
92. See cases cited supra note 39.
93. Id.
94. Bus. Roundtable v. U.S. SEC, 647 F.3d at 1147 (quoting 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668,
56,682-83, 56,782-83).
95. Id. at 1148.
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adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why those costs could
not be quantified; neglected to support its predictive judgments;
contradicted itself; and failed to respond to the substantial problems raised
by commenters.”96
The court’s approach in Business Roundtable II departs from that in
the case’s precedents in a number of ways. First, in terms of standard of
review, whereas the SEC had been entitled to Chevron deference in some
of the prior cases, Chevron had no place in Business Roundtable II, because
there was no issue of statutory interpretation or ambiguity. At its outset,
therefore, the court’s reasoning rested solely on the strict requirements of
the ICA and the APA, without the SEC being owed any deference in its
rulemaking.
Second, the court here showed no recognition for the difficulties an
agency might face in developing its cost-benefit analysis and predicting
future trends. In Chamber of Commerce I, for example, the court exhibited
acute awareness “that an agency need not—indeed cannot—base its every
action upon empirical data; depending upon the nature of the problem, an
agency may be ‘entitled to conduct . . . a general analysis based on
informed conjecture.’”97 In Business Roundtable II on the other hand,
without considering whether this instance would be one where an agency
could base its decision on “informed conjecture,” the court found that “the
Commission’s prediction directors might choose not to oppose shareholder
nominees had no basis beyond mere speculation.”98
Third, unlike in prior cases, the D.C. Circuit here conducted a
substantive assessment of the numbers and data the SEC relied on or
forewent relying on. For example, assessing the SEC’s argument that Rule
14a-11 would improve board performance and increase shareholder value,
the court strongly criticized the SEC for “rel[ying] exclusively and heavily
upon two relatively unpersuasive studies, one concerning the effect of
‘hybrid boards’ (which include some dissident directors) and the other
concerning the effect of proxy contests in general, upon shareholder
value.”99 The court found it insufficient that the SEC had discounted those
studies “because of questions raised by subsequent studies, limitations
acknowledged by the studies’ authors, or [the Commission’s] own concerns
about the studies’ methodology or scope.”100 It is unclear why the court
found the studies the SEC did rely on “relatively unpersuasive,” or why the
96. Id. at 1148-49.
97. Chamber of Commerce I, 412 F.3d at 142 (quoting Melcher v. FCC, 134 F.3d
1143, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
98. Business Roundtable II, 647 F.3d at 1150.
99. Id. at 1151 (emphasis added).
100. Id.
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court found itself, in contrast to other securities-related cases, in a position
to assess the soundness of methodology and empirical data regarding a
promulgated SEC rule.101 Rather, the court “simply chose the opposite side
of a politically charged debate.”102 The court’s intervention here thus
differs widely from its approach in the two other cases where the SEC’s
cost-benefit analysis was found insufficient. In finding that the SEC had
failed to meet its statutory obligation to assess the economic consequences
of a proposed regulation in Chamber of Commerce I, the court did not go
so far as to evaluate the substance of the different studies the SEC had
considered. Rather, acknowledging that the SEC would be “excused for
failing to consider [an] alternative if it were, for whatever reason, unworthy
of consideration,”103 the court merely found that the alternative not assessed
by the SEC was neither frivolous nor out of bounds and thus required
inclusion in the SEC’s weighting.104 In American Equity, where the court
held arbitrary and capricious the SEC’s consideration of efficiency,
competition, and capital-formation implications, the court here, too, did not
assess the soundness of empirical data.105 Rather, it faulted the SEC for
having based its entire reasoning on the shaky assumption that the
existence of a rule—any rule—would have positive repercussions in the
three areas requiring analysis under the APA.106 In contrast, the SEC
submitted to the D.C. Circuit a brief of over sixty pages and thorough
explanations for its promulgation of Rule 14a-11 in preparation for
litigation in Business Roundtable II.107 Furthermore, the court in Business
Roundtable II wrote that the agency “failed to make tough choices about
which of the competing estimates is most plausible, [or] to hazard a guess
as to which is correct.”108 Query whether the D.C. Circuit, under the bar it
had just set for the SEC, would have found acceptable or adequate
reasoning based on a hazarded guess.
Finally and relatedly, whereas the court’s objections to SEC action in
many of Business Roundtable II’s precedents can be attributed to the SEC’s
failure to follow required procedure, it is arguably impossible to do the
same in the 2011 decision. In Business Roundtable I, the court applied
Chevron to reject the SEC’s statutory interpretation that it may take action
101. Id.
102. D.C. Circuit Finds SEC Proxy Access Rule Arbitrary and Capricious for
Inadequate Economic Analysis, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1088, 1094 (2012).
103. 412 F.3d at 144.
104. Id. at 145.
105. 613 F.3d at 179.
106. Id. at 177-79.
107. Brief for Respondent, Bus. Roundtable v. U.S. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (No. 10-1305), 2011 WL 2014799.
108. 647 F.3d at 1150 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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on issues of substantive corporate governance; action in the area of
substantive corporate governance is reserved for the states, the court
reasoned.109 In Teicher, Goldstein, and Financial Planning Association, the
issue was a matter of statutory interpretation and the court never in these
decisions invalidated the SEC rule based on the SEC’s cost-benefit
analysis.110 In Chamber of Commerce I, as discussed above, the rule at
issue was remanded to the SEC because the SEC failed to utilize any
empirical studies per the demands of the ICA and had failed entirely to
consider alternatives, not because the court deemed those alternatives more
persuasive than the empirical evidence presented by the SEC.111 In
Chamber of Commerce II, the basis of the court’s ruling was purely
procedural, given the SEC’s failure to subject new evidence to notice and
comment.112 Finally, in American Equity Life Insurance, the court rejected
the SEC rule because the SEC provided a weak rationale as to how its new
rule improves efficiency, competition and capital formation (“any rule is
better than no rule.”). The SEC’s reasoning was nowhere as thorough as it
was in its adoption of Rule 14a-11.
Lastly, it is also important to note the context of Business Roundtable
II. The SEC promulgated Rule 14a-11 after the enactment of the DoddFrank Consumer Protection Act and its express grant of authority to the
SEC to adopt proxy access rules.113 This context further highlights the D.C.
Circuit’s aggressive approach to reviewing the SEC’s rulemaking.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
The new attitudes exhibited by the D.C. Circuit, for the time being,
and especially if the attitudes self-realize into a long-term trend, will not be
without repercussions for the general field of corporate governance.
Business Roundtable II leaves open the question of just how much
empirical evidence the D.C. Circuit would require to accept SEC action on
corporate governance as adequately reasoned. In the area of shareholder
voting alone, opinions abound as to whether increasing proxy access is
109. Business Roundtable I, 905 F.2d 406, 408-09 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
110. Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d at 483; Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 874; Teicher, 177
F.3d at 1017.
111. Chamber of Commerce I, 412 F.3d at 145.
112. Chamber of Commerce II, 443 F.3d at 909.
113. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 103 Stat. 440 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18,
19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 41, 42, 44, 49, and 112 U.S.C.). The Act was effective in
July 2010. Rule 14a-11 was to be effective in November 2010. Shareholder Nominations,
75 Fed. Reg. 56,782 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-11), invalidated by Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

AL ALAMI - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

558

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/3/2013 1:21 PM

[Vol. 15:2

desirable for the market and, by extension, increases shareholder value.
For example, in an extensive event analysis, Ali C. Akyol concluded that
proxy access diminishes shareholder value.114 In contrast, Bo Becker, also
employing event analysis, concluded that “financial markets placed a
positive value on shareholders access” and, by extension, proxy access
maximizes shareholder value.115 Had the SEC presented one of these
studies over the other, would the court have accepted that? It is indeed
questionable whether it is for the courts, based on the judiciary’s generally
limited expertise in such specialized areas, to assess the substance of these
studies and approve just one as a satisfactory basis for regulatory action.
It is true that some judges are particularly learned and experienced in
securities regulation, with a sophisticated understanding of the field.
However, given the doctrine of stare decisis, as well as the judicial tradition
of courts and judges borrowing from each other across circuit lines, one
judge’s successful heightened scrutiny in a single instance or action is only
in a limited way, if at all, generally acceptable for all judges and courts.116
Even if one deems judges sufficiently well-prepared to so incisively
scrutinize the substance of empirical evidence selected by the SEC as a
check on SEC balance and impartiality, it is difficult to argue that judges
themselves are any more immune to political and other external influences
in their decision-making. For example, Delaware judges take into
consideration the state’s supremacy in charter competition and in setting
national corporate law standards, actively attempt to balance their opinions
with the interests of the state.117
Furthermore, while courts are generally deferential to agencies’
statutory interpretations and other rulemaking under Chevron, the recent
decisions related to statutory interpretation in the D.C. Circuit seem to
dilute that deference—by setting ever-higher bars for meeting the
requirements of the ICA and the standards of arbitrary and capricious
review under the APA, the D.C. Circuit weakens the policy reasons

114. Ali C. Akyol et al., Shareholders in the Boardroom: Wealth Effects of the SEC’s
Rule to Facilitate Director Nominations, (Dept. of Fin., Univ. of Melbourne, Working
Paper, June 7, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1526081.
115. Bo Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence
from the Business Roundtable Challenge 4 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-052,
2010), available at http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6581.html.
116. See D.C. Circuit Finds SEC Proxy Access Rule Arbitrary and Capricious for
Inadequate Economic Analysis, supra note 102, at 1092 (“Courts hardly outperform the
SEC at evaluating the imperfect science of economics. Judges can struggle with expert
testimony in their own decisions, and traditional training leaves most jurists ill-prepared to
engage with sophisticated econometrics.”).
117. Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and Corporate Law: The Case for Regulatory
Redundancy, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1273, 1292 (2009).
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underlying Chevron.
Business Roundtable II, in particular, extends the boundaries of
arbitrary and capricious review—an implication that must not go unchecked. The holding raises serious questions about how the SEC or any
other agency can succeed at a cost-benefit showing. While cost-benefit
analysis should ideally provide an objective, impartial basis for decisionmaking, “[it] has become a powerful weapon in the hands of vocal
opponents of regulation.”118 In their book on the use of cost-benefit
analysis in health and environmental regulation, Frank Ackerman and Lisa
Heinzerling discuss how cost and benefit calculations may be skewed.119
For example, “there is a tendency to overestimate the cost of regulations in
advance of their implementation.”120 In other words, while ideally
objective, cost-benefit analysis is a highly manipulable tool—governments
and businesses alike may influence its outcome based on the desired result.
On the agency side, “officials are not pure technocrats, but political beings
who routinely make decisions based not on their scientific merit, but as a
result of ‘congressional pressure, interest group lobbying, bureaucratic (but
non-expertise-based) policy views, or bureaucratic protection of turf or
other self-interest.’”121 Pressures from other (non-scientific) sources and
self-interest similarly lead businesses to take their own positions.
The court in Business Roundtable II also seems to underestimate the
difficulty of accurately predicting the impact of rules to make a truly
falsifiable empirical cost-benefit case. Especially in the field of financial
and securities regulation, “key variables may be difficult to quantify”122 and
too many externalities are possible. In addition, no guidelines exist for
what the D.C. Circuit will consider sound cost-benefit analysis. If costbenefit analysis is to become a permanent and aggressively reviewed
fixture in SEC rulemaking, the agency must be able to turn to a series of
guidelines or standards such that its analysis is sound without being overly
cumbersome. The SEC would also have to add to its staff industry and
economics experts for the sole reason of keeping up with the standards set

118. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 35 (2004). The authors criticize the use of costbenefit analysis in health and environmental regulation, but many of the points they make
are relevant to financial regulation as well.
119. Id. at 36.
120. Id. at 37 (citing ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING
SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 34 (1989)).
121. Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Lessons from
the SEC’s Stalled Mutual Fund Reform Effort, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 54 (2006)
(quoting Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2278-90
(2001)).
122. Id. at 59.
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in Business Roundtable II.123
The D.C. Circuit has yet to hear another SEC case since Business
Roundtable II, so it is unclear whether the court will attempt to limit the
applicability of its holding. Nonetheless, the courts have cited Business
Roundtable II in a number of opinions examining rules and regulations by
other agencies and departments. On the one hand, there are signs that the
D.C. Circuit may attempt to cabin the holding of Business Roundtable II to
its facts—or perhaps just to the SEC. For example, in American Petroleum
Institute v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit attributed the outcome of Business
Roundtable II to “the [SEC’s] larger failure to deal with the weight of the
evidence against it.”124 Accordingly, the court stated that the American
Petroleum Institute had “mistakenly place[d] much weight” on Business
Roundtable II, because the EPA’s analysis related to a rule on a national
ambient air quality standard for nitrogen dioxide “[is] materially better than
the analysis” for which the SEC was faulted.125 In another opinion, the
court distinguished Business Roundtable II from Ass’n of Private Sector
Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, where the Association sued the
Department and Secretary of Education under the APA for regulations
promulgated under the Higher Education Act.126 The court highlighted that
the Department of Education does not share the “unique [statutory]
obligation” that the SEC has to consider the effect of a rule on efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.127 The court set clear lines for itself
when it put the onus on the regulation challenger to point to data or a study
that an agency ignored. The Association having failed to do so, the court
wrote, renders “Business Roundtable . . . of no help to its argument.”128
Most recently, in Investment Co. Institute v. U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, the D.C. Circuit upheld against challenge
amendments that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
made to regulations regarding commodity pool operators.129 Distinguishing
the CFTC’s decision-making process from that of the SEC in Business
Roundtable II, the court wrote that:
the CFTC not only considered what regulations were already in
123. See Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and
the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1686 (2012) (stating that a practical
consequence of Business Roundtable II is “the need both for additional SEC staff with the
requisite specialized expertise and a process of rulemaking that is more demonstrably
interdisciplinary . . . .”).
124. 684 F.3d 1342, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
125. Id.
126. 681 F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
127. Id. at 448 (quoting Business Roundtable II, 647 F.3d at 1148).
128. Id.
129. No. 12-00612 (BAH), 2012 WL 6185735 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2012).
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place but committed to streamlining the agency’s compliance
requirements. This shows that, unlike the SEC in Business
Roundtable [II], the CFTC considered and evaluated whether
other regulatory requirements “reduce the need for, and hence the
benefit to be had from” registration and reporting requirements
with the CFTC.130
The court concluded: “these cases are distinguishable.”131
On the other hand, in at least one instance, Business Roundtable II
proved helpful to a district court in overturning an agency rule for failure to
present a “satisfactory explanation for [the agency’s] action including a
rational connection between the facts and the choice[s] made.”132 Further,
the distinctly heightened level of judicial scrutiny in Business Roundtable
II may have practical implications. On the one hand, it may increase
litigation as organizations like the Business Roundtable and the Chamber
of Commerce are emboldened to challenge SEC regulations. At the same
time, however, the case exhibited such a high level of scrutiny that it may,
at least temporarily, paralyze the SEC’s ability to promulgate new rules.133
In essence, not only could litigation become unpredictable in the aftermath
of Business Roundtable II, but the case is also “sufficiently threatening that
an overworked and underfunded SEC may feel intimidated and
compromise its rules, watering them down, to avoid the risk of another
humiliating decision . . . .”134
How the D.C. Circuit and other courts will interpret Business
Roundtable II in future cases is thus unclear. When it comes to SEC rules,
however, the D.C. Circuit’s emphasis on cost-benefit analysis prompts the
question: How can the court decide which empirical case is more
convincing without giving deference to one party over another, engaging in
aggressive substantive review or, worse, simply exercising a substantive
veto over regulations it does not like?135
130. Id. at *50.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Berge v. United States, No. 10-0373, 2012 WL 3039736, at *34 (D.D.C.
Jul. 26, 2012) (citing Business Roundtable II) (holding that the applied behavioral analysis
aspect of the Department of Defense health system for the Armed Services was arbitrary and
capricious).
133. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019,
1066 (2012) (arguing that Business Roundtable II “cast[s] a substantial cloud over the
SEC’s continuing ability to adopt other rules implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, even those
not related to corporate governance”).
134. Id. at 1067.
135. See also J. Scott Colesanti, Laws, Sausages, and Bailouts: Testing the Populist
View of the Causes of the Economic Crisis, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 175, 194
(2010) (“As 2010 unfolds, courts occasionally remind observers that the judiciary shall play
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IV. TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO OR SEEK ALTERNATIVES?
Business Roundtable II raises new challenges for the SEC in the area
of securities regulation, and the agency will have to adapt to the heightened
standards set forth in the D.C. Circuit decisions. Short of the D.C. Circuit
retracing a few of its own steps in Business Roundtable II, I see four
possible alternatives that, separately or jointly, can help avoid paralysis in
securities regulation and corporate governance more generally.
First, there is the possibility of private ordering in corporate
governance and particularly on the issue of proxy access and the balance of
power between shareholders and managers. In an article commenting on
proxy access and the fate in the D.C. Circuit of Rule 14a-11, Professor Jill
Fisch argues that “federal regulation is poorly suited for regulating
corporate governance,” whereas “[p]rivate ordering offers a more flexible
mechanism” for doing so.136 Fisch outlines the many deficiencies in the
SEC’s basis for Rule 14a-11 while criticizing the court’s oversight of these
problems in favor of taking “the unprecedented approach of secondguessing the conclusions of the SEC’s economic analysis.”137 Private
ordering could help prevent such judicial moves while alleviating the
“destructive ambiguity” of proxy access.138
Conversely, and as a second alternative, Congress could enact
legislation that explicitly states what the SEC will have to promulgate as a
final rule on contentious governance and securities issues, such as proxy
access. Of course, this alternative is far from ideal because it undermines
the SEC’s rulemaking authority and, more importantly, puts corporate
governance in the hands of non-expert actors (members of Congress) who
often yield to political pressures.
Third, a sort of “rapprochement” between the D.C. Circuit and the
SEC could be brokered if the former begins to recognize, and the latter
begins to admit, the role of politics in rulemaking.139 This would entail the
agency acknowledging instances where politics superseded empirical
reasoning and courts viewing certain political influences as appropriate and
legitimate.140 The benefits of such a relationship include de-politicizing
science, softening the “ossification” charge increasingly directed at

a role in the resolution of the economic crisis.”).
136. Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J.
435, 435 (2012).
137. Id. at 439.
138. Id.
139. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009).
140. Id.
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arbitrary and capricious review, and enabling greater political
accountability by forcing disclosure of agencies’ political influences.141
Under this scenario, the SEC may still have to analyze costs and benefits,
but legitimate political influences in its decision-making would not prove
automatically fatal to a rule.
Fourth, the change could come from within the SEC, whereby the
SEC would “reorient the reasoning supporting the proposed regulatory
initiative”142 and would do so “as a lawyer, not as an econometrician or
empiricist.”143 In other words, that the D.C. Circuit has struck each one of
the challenged SEC rules since Business Roundtable I could be more about
the approach and methodology of the SEC team defending the rule. The
SEC must recognize the key role that “[s]ophisticated number crunching”
has come to play in the development of contemporary corporate law,144 and
must strengthen its abilities accordingly. It could also draw some lessons
from the way other agencies go about conducting cost-benefit analyses to
overcome judicial challenges to their rules and regulations.145
Finally, if cost-benefit analysis is to be accepted as an essential tool in
securities regulations and other SEC rulemaking, reform measures can be
undertaken to prevent two evils: that judges and courts substitute the
SEC’s judgment for their own as a sort of substantive veto, and that the
Commission “draft lengthy statements of basis and purpose filled with
lengthy explanations and data that courts ultimately may, or may not,
consider” adequate.146 Such reforms could include promulgating formal
cost-benefit analysis guidelines for the SEC to follow in its rulemaking,
creating a cost-sharing structure between the SEC, other financial
regulators, and industry actors so that running the analysis would not
become too costly for the SEC (a stick for the industry), and requiring ex
post analyses of promulgated regulation in an effort to inform future
empirical studies (a stick for the SEC).147 In addition, the SEC could be
allowed to subject the cost-benefit analysis tool to a cost-benefit analysis to
ascertain whether the tool is worthwhile in specific instances of
rulemaking, thus “limit[ing] the use of [cost-benefit analysis] to those cases
where the efficiency gains resulting from such analysis are likely to exceed
141. Id. at 40-45.
142. Cox & Baucom, supra note 4, at 1839.
143. Cox & Baucom, supra note 4, at 1840.
144. Matthew T. Bodie, The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law: Returning to
the Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1033, 1037 (2012).
145. See generally Cox & Baucom, supra note 4, at 1840–43 (examining “recent signs”
that cost-benefit analysis and economists more generally would be given a greater role in the
Commission’s rulemaking processes).
146. Watts, supra note 139, at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Sherwin, supra note 121, at 53–58.
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its costs.”148
CONCLUSION
This Comment has explored the D.C. Circuit’s holdings in cases
challenging the SEC’s rulemaking in the area of securities regulations since
1990. While the D.C. Circuit invalidated the SEC rule in question in each
of the eight challenges before it, the most recent decision, Business
Roundtable II, constitutes a turning point in judicial review of SEC action.
By undertaking aggressive substantive review of the SEC’s economic
analysis and empirical reasoning, the D.C. Circuit engaged in
unprecedented heightened judicial scrutiny towards the SEC and set forth
new (if vague) demands for extensive empirical basis and cost-benefit
analysis in SEC rulemaking. The case thus raises questions about the
SEC’s future rulemaking ability and whether it will be able to make
falsifiable empirically-based cases for its rules that the court could deem
adequate.
With the relationship between the judiciary and the SEC at a clear
crossroads and a phenomenon of judicial aggression identified, it is now
important to think about the road ahead and the measures necessary to
serve the public interest such that years of advances in corporate
governance and regulation are not so easily—or inadvertently—
eviscerated.

148. Sherwin, supra note 121, at 59.

